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Comment
Prosecution Laches in the Wake of Symbol
Technologies:
What Is "Unreasonable and Unexplained" Delay?
Michael T. Hawkins*
"I said, 'It's unethical,' and he said, 'It's not illegal.'"
- Arthur Lieberman'

INTRODUCTION
The patent laws of the United States are often viewed as a
delicate balance between two key interests: providing fair
incentives to inventors for their discoveries, and protecting the
unfettered use of inventions that are already known to the
public. 2 Accordingly, a rule-abiding inventor who prosecutes an
application before the United States Patent and Trademark
Office (PTO) receives a fixed period of exclusivity for the
patentable invention. 3 Significant inequities arise, however,
when that inventor delays issuance of the patent claims while
others independently develop the invention covered by the
claims and put it into the public domain. 4 In Symbol
Technologies, Inc. v. Lemelson Medical, Education & Research
* J.D. Candidate 2004, University of Minnesota Law School; B.S.M.E.
2000, University of Minnesota. The Author would like to thank John
Dragseth for his brilliant commentary and guidance in the development of this
Comment. Amy M. Samela, Rachel Clark Hughey, Thomas R. Hipkins, and
the staff of the Minnesota Law Review provided exceptional editing and
attention to detail. This Comment is dedicated to my family and my fianc6e,
Addy, for their unconditional support and to God for His amazing grace.
1. Nicholas Varchaver, The PatentKing, FORTUNE, May 14, 2001, at 202,
212 (quoting Arthur Lieberman, former legal counsel for Jerome H. Lemelson,
describing a conversation with Lemelson).
2. See Pfaffv. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 65 (1998) ("The patent laws
therefore seek both to protect the public's right to retain knowledge already in
the public domain and the inventor's right to control whether and when he
may patent his invention.").
3. See infra notes 17-21 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 29-36 and accompanying text.
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Foundation, the Federal Circuit sought to balance these
competing interests while resolving the5 viability of an equitable
doctrine known as prosecution laches.
In Symbol Technologies, a group of bar-code equipment
manufacturers (Symbol Technologies) brought a declaratory
judgment action against the Lemelson Medical, Education &
Research Foundation (Lemelson Foundation), the assignee of
more than 185 patents issued to Jerome H. Lemelson. 6 In
particular, sixteen of these patents issued between 1978 and
1994 and claimed benefit to the filing dates of original
applications filed in 1954 and 1956. 7 Lemelson had maintained
the pending status of these applications at the PTO by means
of filing continuation and divisional applications over a period
of several decades. 8
Although this type of prolonged
prosecution of patent claims, sometimes referred to as
"submarine" patenting, does not violate any pertinent rules or
statutes, Symbol Technologies urged the court to apply
prosecution laches to bar enforcement of Lemelson's delayed
patent claims. 9 The trial court disagreed and held that the
1952 Patent Act-the most recent major patent enactmentabrogated the doctrine of prosecution laches and that "the court
should not intervene in equity to regulate what Congress has
not."10
The Federal Circuit granted Symbol Technologies's petition
for an interlocutory appeal on the issue of prosecution laches."I
5.

277 F.3d 1361, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 113

(2002).
6. Id.
7. Id.; see also infra note 53 (listing the sixteen patents at issue in the
Symbol Technologies case).

8. See infra notes 29-33 and accompanying text (describing the use of
continuation and divisional applications to extend the prosecution of patent
claims); infra note 53 (listing sixteen of Lemelson's patents that claim priority,
by way of continuation and divisional applications, to two original applications
filed decades earlier).
9. Symbol Techs., 277 F.3d at 1363 (noting that the "gravamen of the
complaints most pertinent to us is prosecution laches").
10. Symbol Techs., Inc. v. Lemelson Med., Educ. & Research Found., No.
99CV0397, 2000 WL 33709453, at *6 (D. Nev. Mar. 21, 2000) (quoting Ford
Motor Co. v. Lemelson, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d 1706, 1709 (D. Nev. 1997)), rev'd, 277
F.3d 1361, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 113 (2002).
11. Symbol Techs., Inc. v. Lemelson Med., Educ. & Research Found., 243
F.3d 558 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (unpublished table decision) (granting an

interlocutory appeal on the issue of prosecution laches), explained at 2000 WL
1300430, at *1 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 1, 2000), considered at 277 F.3d 1361, 1363
(Fed. Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 113 (2002).
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In particular, it decided a single issue: "whether, as a matter of
law, the equitable doctrine of laches may be applied to bar
enforcement of patent claims that issued after an unreasonable
and unexplained delay in prosecution even though the
12
applicant complied with pertinent statutes and rules."
Because Congress did not explicitly abrogate prosecution laches
in the 1952 Patent Act, and because the Federal Circuit had
never addressed this issue in a precedential opinion, much of
the patent law community attentively awaited the Symbol
Technologies court's decision. 13
Ultimately, the Symbol
Technologies court held that the prosecution laches defense was
not eliminated by the 1952 Patent Act. 14 District courts are
now left to flesh out an applicable test to determine when the
equitable defense should bar enforcement of patent claims.15
This Comment analyzes the Symbol Technologies court's
holding and extracts from the case, with support from other
Federal Circuit case law, a prosecution laches test that
appropriately balances the interest in providing fair incentives
to inventors with the interest of protecting those who are
prejudiced by unreasonably delayed patent claims. Part I of
this Comment describes the fundamentals of patent
prosecution and how "submarine" patents may issue under the
current laws, the details of Lemelson's masterfully constructed
patent portfolios, and the history of the prosecution laches
defense before and after the 1952 Patent Act. Part II analyzes
the Symbol Technologies court's reasoning, the Lemelson
Foundation's opposing arguments, and Judge Newman's
dissenting opinion. Finally, Part III of this Comment addresses
the fallout of the Symbol Technologies holding as it relates to
Symbol Techs., 277 F.3d at 1363.
13. See infra Parts I.C.2-3; see also Varchaver, supra note 1, at 216
(noting that the remaining Lemelson litigation was stayed in anticipation of
the Federal Circuit's decision in Symbol Technologies).
14. See infra notes 148-51 and accompanying text.
15. After the Federal Circuit upheld the existence of the prosecution
laches defense with little direction on applying it, the Supreme Court refused
to grant certiorari to the Lemelson Foundation. Lemelson Med., Educ. &
Research Found. v. Symbol Techs., 123 S. Ct. 113 (2002), denying cert. to 277
F.3d at 1363-65. As a result, the doctrine of prosecution laches will likely be a
basis for litigation involving patent claims that issue from continuation
applications. See 1 JOHN M. SKENYON ET AL., PATENT DAMAGES LAW AND
PRACTICE § 5:42.1 (2002) ("[It is predictable that in the short run, the doctrine
of prosecution laches will be frequently asserted against most patents
stemming from a divisional or continuation application, regardless of the
actual length of any 'delay' in prosecution.").
12.
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future patent litigation and to courts that must determine
whether prosecution laches bars the enforcement of patent
claims. This Comment concludes that the Symbol Technologies
court's reasoning was proper and sets forth a practical testformulated from Supreme Court precedents, the Symbol
Technologies case, and the Federal Circuit's law involving the
traditional form of laches-for determining the application of
prosecution laches.
I. PATENT PROSECUTION AND THE DOCTRINE OF
PROSECUTION LACHES
A. PATENT PROSECUTION FUNDAMENTALS AND "SUBMARINE"
PATENTING

The patent laws of the United States must "promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts." 16 To further that purpose
and encourage innovation, the government provides inventors
with limited exclusivity for a fixed time.' 7 The process of
obtaining a patent from the PTO, known as patent
prosecution, 8 officially begins with the filing of a patent
application.19

Prosecution of an application through patent

16. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see also Graham v. John Deere Co., 383
U.S. 1, 6 (1966) ("Innovation, advancement, and things which add to the sum
of useful knowledge are inherent requisites in a patent system which by
constitutional command must 'promote the Progress of... useful Arts.' This is
the standardexpressed in the Constitution and it may not be ignored.").
17. See Sinclair & Carroll Co. v. Interchemical Corp., 325 U.S. 327, 330-31
(1945). The limited exclusivity is described by statute as a "right to exclude
others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling the invention." 35
U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2000); see also id. § 271(a)(1) (defining patent
infringement). For applications filed after June 8, 1995, a patentee may
enforce this right to exclude others for a term of twenty years from the earliest
effective filing date of the application. See id. § 154(a)(2). The Supreme Court
has portrayed this right as the "hallmark of a protected property interest."
Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S.
666, 673 (1999).
18. See ROBERT P. MERGES & JOHN F. DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND POLICY

50 (3d. ed. 2002).
19.

See 4 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS

§§

11.01-11.02 (2002);

see also 35 U.S.C. § 111. A completed patent application must include a
written description of the invention and at least one claim. 4 CHISUM, supra, §
11.01; see 35 U.S.C. § 112. The written description must disclose "the
invention, and the manner and process of making and using it," while the
claims must point out and distinctly claim "the subject matter which the
applicant regards as his invention." Id. Ultimately, the claims are the
substance of the patent right and are "the portion of the patent document that
defines the scope of the patentee's rights."
Markman v. Westview
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issuance includes a period of examination, during which the
examiner rejects any patent claims that do not satisfy certain
statutory requirements. 20 The applicant may amend rejected
claims during prosecution in an attempt to achieve
21
patentability.
In certain cases, the patent applicant may choose to file a
continuation application that claims priority to an effective
filing date of an earlier-filed application. 22 Applicants often
seek to claim priority to an earlier filing date to limit the
universe of prior art references that the examiner may use to
reject or invalidate the claims. 23 The statutory requirements
Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 372 (1996).
20. 35 U.S.C. § 131; see 4 CHISUM, supra note 19, § 11.03[1][b]. For
example, allowable patent claims must satisfy the patentability requirements
of novelty, nonobviousness, and enablement. See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (setting forth
the basic requirements of novelty); id. § 103 (expressing the nonobvious
requirement of patentability); id. § 112 (requiring that the written description
portray the claimed invention so as to "enable any person skilled in the art...
to make and use the same").
21. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.111 (2002). The examiner evaluates each application
at least twice before imposing a final rejection. 35 U.S.C. § 132(a). The
applicant has several options after receiving a final rejection. See, e.g., id. §
133 (describing that the application may be "abandoned"); id. § 134(a)
(allowing the applicant to "appeal . . .to the Board of Patent Appeals and
Interferences"); id. § 120 (permitting the applicant to continue prosecution
through a continuation application).
22. See 35 U.S.C. § 120. A continuation that claims priority to an earlierfiled application is known as a "child" application. See, e.g., Advanced
Cardiovascular Sys., Inc. v. Medtronic, Inc., 265 F.3d 1294, 1305 (Fed. Cir.
2001). This relational pattern may extend, for example, such that a chain of
continuation applications includes the original application ("grandparent"), a
continuation ("parent"), and a subsequent continuation ("child"). 4 CHISUM,
supra note 19, § 13.03; MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 18, at 51. One practical
reason for filing a continuation occurs when an applicant files a continuation
that claims a potentially patentable invention that is described, but not
claimed, in the parent application. See, e.g., Kennecott Corp. v. Kyocera Int'l,
Inc., 835 F.2d 1419, 1420-21 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (describing that the continuation
application claimed an "equiaxed microstructure" that was disclosed but not
covered by the parent application's claims to a "sintered ceramic body").
Another reasonable basis for filing a continuation is when the PTO allows
claims with a narrow scope but rejects the broader claims of an original
application. In such cases, the applicant may file a continuation application to
actively prosecute the claims with a broad scope while the original application
issues as a patent with narrower claims. See, e.g., Johnson & Johnston
Assocs. Inc. v. R.E. Serv. Co., 285 F.3d 1046, 1055 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (en banc)
(per curiam) (noting that a patentee may file a continuation application to
"attempt to enlarge the scope of the original claims to include disclosed but
previously unclaimed subject matter").
23. Li Second Family Ltd. P'ship v. Toshiba Corp., 231 F.3d 1373, 1379-80
(Fed. Cir. 2000) ("Because the effective filing date of each claim in a patent
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for filing a continuation application include copendency,
common inventorship, claims that are fully supported by the
disclosure of the parent application, and a filing fee. 24 To
satisfy the copendency requirement, a related application must
be pending before the PTO at the time of filing the
continuation. 25 In addition, if the continuation application
claims priority to a grandparent application, at least one of the
earlier-filed applications (either the parent or grandparent)
26
must be pending at the time the continuation is filed.
Importantly, there is no statutory limit on the number of
continuations that applicants may file, and there is no limit on
the number of earlier-filed applications to which a continuation
may claim priority. 27 As such, a patient applicant who is
willing to pay the filing fees could maintain a chain of
continuation applications pending at the PTO for a long period
28
of time.
Most patents that issued from applications filed with the
PTO on or before June 8, 1995, received a term of seventeen
years from the date of issuance. 29 Thus, an inventor could
construct long chains of continuation applications, in which the
parent applications were abandoned after each subsequent
continuation was filed, over an extended period of time while
repeatedly pushing back the beginning of the seventeen year
term. 30 Because the PTO maintained the confidentiality of
these applications, 31 industries would naturally mature around
application determines which references are available as prior art for purposes
of §§ 102 and 103, information regarding the effective filing date is of the
utmost importance to an examiner.").
24. 4 CHISUM, supra note 19, § 13.01; see 35 U.S.C. § 120; id. § 132(a).
Currently, the basic fee for filing each application is $740.00 ($370.00 for small
entities). 37 C.F.R. § 1.16 (2002).
25. 35 U.S.C. § 120 (requiring that the patent application be "filed before
the patenting or abandonment of or termination of proceedings on the first
application or on an application similarly entitled to the benefit of the filing
date of the first application").
26. See id.
27. See In re Henriksen, 399 F.2d 253, 261 (C.C.P.A. 1968).
28. See Mark A. Lemley, An Empirical Study of the Twenty-Year Patent
Term, 22 AIPLA Q.J. 369, 377-79 (1994).
29. See 35 U.S.C. § 154(c)(1).
30. See Steve Blount, The Use of Delaying Tactics to Obtain Submarine
Patents and Amend Around a Patent that a Competitor Has Designed Around,
81 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 11, 15-16 (1999); see, e.g., Exxon Corp. v.
Phillips Petroleum Co., 265 F.3d 1249, 1250-51 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (tracing a
chain of several continuation applications).
31. Before 1999, the PTO maintained strict secrecy of pending or
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the technology claimed in the chain of applications without
32
awareness of the potential threat of patent infringement.
This type of patent prosecution is commonly referred to as
"submarine" patenting because a decade or more after filing the
original application, a patent may "surface" from the PTO to
convert industry leaders who truly developed the technology
into patent infringers. 33 For example, George Selden filed a
patent application in 1879 on the automobile. His prototype,
however, did not necessarily work well and was not

abandoned patent applications until the application issued as a patent. 35
U.S.C. § 122 (1994), amended by Domestic Publication of Foreign Filed Patent
Applications Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-113 app. I, 113 Stat. 1501A-561. The
new law requires that pending applications be published, with a few
exceptions, eighteen months after "the earliest filing date for which a benefit
is sought." 35 U.S.C. § 122(b)(1)(A) (2000).
32. See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. Lemelson, Nos. CV-N-92-613-LDG(PHA),
CV-N-92-545-LDG(PHA), 1995 WL 628330, at *15 (D. Nev. June 16, 1995)
(finding that the defendant and other manufacturers who independently
developed the claimed technology long before the patentee drafted the claims
at issue suffered prejudice) (Atkins, Magis. J.), recommendation not adopted
by Ford Motor Co. v. Lemelson, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d 1706 (D. Nev. 1997) (George,
Chief J.). Chief Judge George refused to adopt Magistrate Judge Atkins's
recommendation not because he disagreed with the assessment of Lemelson's
conduct, but because he was reluctant to restrict patent practice for equitable
reasons. Ford Motor, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1707-08 (agreeing that Lemelson
"exploited an open area of patent practice," and describing Magistrate Judge
Atkins's recommendation as "thoroughly and thoughtfully" reasoned, but
concluding that "the court should not intervene in equity to regulate what
Congress has not"). But see Thomas Eschweiler, Ford v. Lemelson and
ContinuingApplication Laches Revisited, 79 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y
457, 457 (1997) (concluding that Chief Judge George's holding was "not
required by the case law or the legislative history of the 1952 Patent Act").
33. Thomas G. Eschweiler, Ford v. Lemelson and ContinuingApplication
Laches, 79 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOc'Y 401, 424 n.132 (1997); Lemley,
supra note 28, at 377-78; David L. Marcus, Comment, Is the Submarine Patent
Torpedoed?: Ford Motor Co. v. Lemelson and the Revival of Continuation
Application Laches, 70 TEMP. L. REV. 521, 525 (1997). Notably, the delay
associated with the prosecution of a submarine patent may include both
continuation and divisional applications. See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 5,351,078
(issued Sept. 27, 1994) (showing a patent that issued in 1994 that claimed
priority to an original application filed in 1954-forty years of prosecution-by
way of continuation and divisional applications). A divisional application
arises where the applicant attempts to claim "distinct inventions" in a single
application, which results in a restriction requirement. 35 U.S.C. § 121; see 37
C.F.R. § 1.141 (2002). In response, the applicant may elect to prosecute claims
associated with only one distinct invention, and file divisional applications to
prosecute the claims to the other inventions. Id. §§ 1.142, 1.146. The
divisional application may claim priority to the filing date of the original
application if it complies with the previously described requirements of § 120.
35 U.S.C. § 121.
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commercialized. 34 Selden's application was pending before the
35
PTO for sixteen years before finally issuing as a patent.
Under the patent laws that were in effect until 1994, Selden's
patent term extended to 1912 (thirty-three years after the
application was originally filed), which allowed him to wield his
36
power over the developing industry.
In 1994, Congress amended § 154 to conform to the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and to simultaneously
deal with the problem of "submarine" patents. 37 Under the
amended law, patents that issue from applications filed after
June 8, 1995 are valid for twenty years from the earliest
effective filing date. 38 The amended law sought to destroy the
incentive for maintaining "submarine" patents because each
day spent prosecuting the application before the PTO resulted
39
in a loss of one day from the patent term.
Contrary to some commentators' conclusions, 40 there are
two reasons why the congressional amendment has not cured
the problems associated with submarine patents. 4' First, the
amended law applies only to applications filed after June 8,
1995, so many potential submarine patents filed before that
date issued recently (after lengthy periods of prosecution) and
received seventeen year terms. 42
As such, these fresh
"submarine" patents may still wreak havoc on the
independently developed industries as if the amendment never
passed. 43 Second, the amended law does not eliminate the
problem of "submarine" patents from applications filed after
June 8, 1995. 44 Even today, patent prosecution delays of less
34. Lemley, supra note 28, at 378.
35. U.S. Patent No. 549,160 (issued Nov. 5, 1895); Lemley, supra note 28,
at 378.
36. Lemley, supra note 28, at 378.
37. Id. at 370, 376-77.
38. See id. at 370. Applications that were filed on or before June 8, 1995,
but issued as patents after that date, receive the longer of seventeen years
from issue or twenty years from filing. Id. at 382 (describing the "transition
rule").
39. See id. at 371.
40. See, e.g., Blount, supra note 30, at 24 (concluding that the amended
patent term helped "put a stop to the threat of submarine warfare").
41. See Marcus, supra note 33, at 525-26.
42. Id. at 526 (noting that, as of 1997, "thousands of patents" filed before
June 8, 1995, have issued or will issue and "each and every one of these
applications" are entitled to the old seventeen-year term).
43. See id.
44. Id. (describing that "even when there are no longer any patents
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1629
industries

B. JEROME H. LEMELSON: CUNNING INVENTOR OR
MANIPULATIVE PATENTEE?

Jerome Lemelson is regarded as both a role model to selfmade inventors and the most infamous holder of "submarine"
patents. 46 Lemelson is the named inventor on more than 550
patents and has many more patent applications still pending at
the PTO. 47 His patents include inventive contributions or
improvements to portable cassette players (e.g., Sony
Walkmans), VCRs, bar-code scanning equipment, automated

warehouse systems, fax machines, camcorders, robots, ATMs,
crying toy dolls, propeller beanies, shaving razors, toy racecar
tracks, and cancer detection equipment. 48

He established the

Lemelson Foundation with his wife, Dorothy, and has assigned

entitled to a seventeen year term, inventors will still be able to engage in
submarine patenting").
45. See Blount, supra note 30, at 16-17 (pointing out that "if a submarine
patent is kept submerged for 15 years, it can still wreak a lot of havoc in its
remaining five"); Lemley, supra note 28, at 378 ("The problem of submarine
patents is particularly troublesome in industries characterized by rapid
innovation, since even a modest delay in prosecution can result in catching an
entire industry unaware."); Marcus, supra note 33, at 526 ("There are many
industries where it may take far less than a decade or two for the participants
to become entirely dependent on an underlying technology."). Many patent
applications filed in 1999 or later are now published by the PTO
approximately eighteen months after filing, see supra note 31, but an
applicant may refuse the publication (and thereby maintain secrecy of the
application) by informing the PTO that no foreign applications will be filed.
See 35 U.S.C. § 122 (2000).
46. See Blount, supra note 30, at 19 ("While many who know nothing of
patent law admired him for his wealth, . . .many who knew something of
patent law did not . . . ."). Compare Janet Rae-Dupree, Powers of Invention,
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Feb. 11, 2002, at 66, 66 (labeling Lemelson as a
"defender of inventors' rights"), with Lemley, supra note 28, at 379 ("Today,
the most famous holder of'submarine patents' is Jerome Lemelson.").
47. Varchaver, supra note 1, at 204 (stating that Lemelson "earned 558
patents (some came after his death), which leaves him four places behind...
Thomas Edison"); see also Eschweiler, supra note 33, at 402 (noting that
Lemelson had more than 500 patents, and calling him "the most prolific
inventor alive"); Rae-Dupree, supra note 46, at 66 ("So far, Lemelson has 566
patents to his name, the most of any American inventor since Thomas
Edison.").
48. See Eschweiler, supra note 33, at 402; Greg Gatlin, Gillette Must Pay
$10M Patent Judgment, BOSTON HERALD, June 19, 2002, 2002 WL 4079147;
Rae-Dupree, supra note 46, at 66.
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more than 180 unexpired patents to it.49 Although the
Lemelson Foundation is a for-profit organization, it has used
the wealth accumulated from these patents to promote
innovation and entrepreneurship by establishing the $500,000
annual Lemelson-MIT Prize, the Lemelson Center at the
50
Smithsonian Museum, and various other programs.
Many in the field of intellectual property view Lemelson
not as a generous philanthropist but as a manipulator of the
patent system who used his patent portfolio to hold
independently developed industries hostage.5 '
Lemelson's
strategy included the filing of huge patent applications that are
described as "incredibly vague." 52 For example, a family of
patents in the Lemelson portfolio, the "machine vision" patents,
disclose "a means whereby a video picture signal may be used
to effect automatic quality control." 53 Professionals in the
49. Edward T. Colbert & Kenneth R. Corsello, Prosecution Laches, NAT'L
L.J., Feb. 25, 2002, at A19 (stating that the Lemelson Foundation is "the
assignee of more than 180 unexpired patents and pending patent applications
of the late Jerome Lemelson"); Rae-Dupree, supra note 46, at 67 (describing
that profits from Lemelson's patent portfolio "enabled him and his wife to
establish the Lemelson Foundation").
50. Rae-Dupree, supra note 46, at 66 (describing the philanthropy of the
Lemelson Foundation and that "[elven his detractors give a nod of approval to
that part of his legacy").
51. Eschweiler, supra note 33, at 402 (stating that others in the
intellectual property field believe that Lemelson "is an extortionist who has
manipulated the patent system"); see Eric W. Pfeiffer, Setting Patent Traps:A
66-Year-Old Tycoon Is Set to Make $2 Billion on 46 Patents, FORBES ASAP,
June 24, 2002, at 65 ("In some instances, by masterfully playing the patent
system, Lemelson submitted patents in the 1950s and, after several decades,
the patent would finally be issued. By then, they were full of amendments
that miraculously contained the latest cutting-edge technology."); Varchaver,
supra note 1, at 204 (asserting that Lemelson's "most lucrative patents were
the product of a masterful exploitation of the patent system").
52. Varchaver, supra note 1, at 208 ("Lemelson would grind down
examiners by submitting 'jumbo' applications that stretched to more than 100
pages."). Some examiners assigned to Lemelson's applications began referring
to him as "Black Box Jerry" due to his use of broad concepts with very little
technical detail. Id.
53. E.g., U.S. Patent No. 5,351,078 (issued Sept. 27, 1994); U.S. Patent
No. 5,283,641 (issued Feb. 1, 1994); U.S. Patent No. 5,249,045 (issued Sept.
28, 1993); U.S. Patent No. 5,144,421 (issued Sept. 1, 1992); U.S. Patent No.
5,128,753 (issued July 7, 1992); U.S. Patent No. 5,119,205 (issued June 2,
1992); U.S. Patent No. 5,119,190 (issued June 2, 1992); U.S. Patent No.
5,067,012 (issued Nov. 19, 1991); U.S. Patent No. 5,023,714 (issued June 11,
1991); U.S. Patent No. 4,984,073 (issued Jan. 8, 1991); U.S. Patent No.
4,979,029 (issued Dec. 18, 1990); U.S. Patent No. 4,969,038 (issued Nov. 6,
1990); U.S. Patent No. 4,511,918 (issued Apr. 16, 1985); U.S. Patent No.
4,338,626 (issued July 6, 1982); U.S. Patent No. 4,148,061 (issued Apr. 3,
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machine vision and bar-code industries emphasize that
Lemelson's original disclosures are "quite different from how
54
machine vision is practiced or ever was practiced."
Nevertheless, many companies have capitulated to the
complexity of Lemelson's "machine vision" portfolio and paid
55
royalty fees that were "slightly below the threshold of pain."
As a result, Lemelson (and more recently, the Lemelson
Foundation) reaped mammoth profits from various settlements
and royalty agreements, which fueled
the fires for even more
56
patent enforcement and lawsuits.
1979); U.S. Patent No. 4,118,730 (issued Oct. 3, 1978). These sixteen patents
contain a total of 547 claims, and all of them profess some priority date
relationship to abandoned applications that were filed in the 1950s. See
sources cited supra. Importantly, many of these claims are directed to barcode scanning equipment and were not drafted until 1989. See Lloyd Johnson
& Anastasia D. Kelly, A United Front Stops a Legal Juggernaut,CORP. LEGAL
TIMES, Mar. 2002, at 12 ("[Lemelson's patent attorney] began filing new barcode type claims to Lemelson's pending patent applications in September
1989. Once granted, he set out to sue users of bar-code technology-which
includes just about everyone."). Lemelson's "machine vision" patent portfolio
embraces much more than the sixteen previously listed patents, including
additional applications still pending before the PTO. Varchaver, supra note 1,
at 214, 216 (discussing Lemelson's practice of maintaining applications at the
PTO as a means of convincing companies to accept settlements and noting
that even if Lemelson's adversaries managed to invalidate one claim, "dozens
more would rise to take its place").
54. Varchaver, supra note 1, at 210, 216 (quoting Professor Steve
Dickerson, a patentee of machine vision technology, and describing similar
statements made by George Laurer, the unchallenged inventor of the
Universal Product Code). In fact, Laurer believes that Lemelson's "invention,"
as it relates to bar-coding, is "so far out in left field" that he not only refused to
testify on behalf of Lemelson, but has offered to testify for free on behalf of his
opponents. Id. at 216.
55. Bernie Knill, Lemelson Decision Will Shape Bar Coding, MATERIAL
HANDLING MGMT., Sept. 1, 2002, at 20, 2002 WL 12148335; see also Pfeiffer,
supra note 51, at 65 ("When faced with a large number of complicated patents,
it's cheaper for companies to pay for a license than to hire expensive attorneys
to figure out their merit . . . ."); Varchaver, supra note 1, at 210-12 (quoting a
business letter from Lemelson that states that "[i]f we overwhelm them with
our patents, they should comply and take a license").
56. Brigid McMenamin, Depth Charge: Jerome Lemelson Turned an
Obscure "Submarine Patent" into $1 Billion-Plus in Royalties. The Sub Just
Took a Hit, FORBES, May 13, 2002, at 56 (reporting that "[o]ver the past
decade Lemelson and his heirs have hauled in $1.5 billion in licensing fees
from 940 auto, computer, retail, electronics and other firms"); Varchaver,
supra note 1, at 214 (describing how, within months after the Japanese auto
industry reluctantly agreed to pay Lemelson $100 million, thirty other
European and Japanese companies also fell in line and presented another
$350 million to him). After Lemelson obtained these victories with foreign
companies, he then focused on the American auto industry. Varchaver, supra
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C. PROSECUTION LACHES: FROM EQUITABLE ROOTS TO

QUESTIONABLE EXISTENCE

The doctrine of laches is a well-established defense against
a party who has delayed in asserting a known right so as to
prejudice the opposing party.57 Generally, the traditional form
of laches equitably bars plaintiffs who, by delaying their
58
bringing of the lawsuit, cause prejudice to the defendant.
Although laches is a well-established defense where the
patentee delays in bringing a patent infringement lawsuit,59 the
law is quite unsettled where the patentee unreasonably
delayed in prosecuting the patent claims before the PTO.60 This
unsettled law, known as prosecution laches or continuation
laches, has undeniable roots in the Supreme Court
jurisprudence prior to the 1950s, 6 1 but opponents of the
of the 1952
prosecution laches doctrine point to the enactment
62
Patent Act as an implicit abrogation of it.

note 1, at 214. The ill-fated irony of the Lemelson saga is that most of the
wealth accumulated by his patents was collected after his death. Id. at 216.
His patent portfolio, however, remains very much alive today and is vigorously
enforced by his legal counsel, Gerald Hosier. McMenamin, supra, at 56
(noting that revenue from Lemelson's portfolio made Hosier the highest paid
attorney in the United States in 2000 with an income of $40 million and three
jets, and that Hosier expects the machine vision portfolio to collect $1 billion
more from other defendants).
57. 27A AM. JUR. 2D Equity § 157 (1996). The Supreme Court has
paraphrased the doctrine of laches to say that "no one should be relieved who
has slept upon his rights." Wollensak v. Reiher, 115 U.S. 96, 100 (1885). In
addition, the Federal Circuit generally defined the term "laches" to be
"slackness or carelessness toward duty or opportunity." A.C. Aukerman Co. v.
R.L. Chaides Constr. Co., 960 F.2d 1020, 1028 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (en banc)
(citation omitted).
58. Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1028-29. The "delay" in asserting a known
right has been stated in various terms, such as lack of diligence, lapse of time,
or failure to timely assert such right or claim. 27A AM. JUR. 2D Equity § 158
(1996). Similarly, the "prejudice" element of laches has been defined to
include injury, harm, hardship, damage, disadvantage, unfairness, injustice,
inequity, or change of position. Id.
59. See Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1028-29.
60. See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. Lemelson, Nos. CV-N-92-613-LDG(PHA),
CV-N-92-545-LDG(PHA), 1995 WL 628330, at *7 (D. Nev. June 16, 1995);
infra Part I.C.3.
61. See infra Part I.C.1.
62. See Eschweiler, supra note 32, at 457-59 (describing how a district
court denied the prosecution laches defense due to the effect of the 1952
Patent Act); see also infra notes 118-25 and accompanying text.
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1. Prosecution Laches Prior to the 1952 Patent Act
In Woodbridge v. United States, the Supreme Court
directly confronted the situation in which an applicant
intentionally delayed the issuance of his patent claims to
exploit the patent's commercial value. 63 The applicant delayed
the issuance of his allowed patent claims for one year, which
was permissible by statute at the time, to preserve his right to
file a foreign patent application. 64 The PTO stored his file in
the secret archives, and neither he nor the PTO did anything
for over nine years. 65 The applicant requested the issuance
after this delay and admitted that he had allowed the delay "to
66
avail himself of the value of the patent."
The Supreme Court began by analyzing the constitutional
purposes and legislative intent of the patent laws. 67
Additionally, the Court noted the intervening rights of other
inventors that arose during the applicant's delay. 68 The Court
held that the applicant forfeited any right to a patent because
of his designed delay. 69 This holding was not a limited one, but
instead the Court broadly declared that "[a]ny practice by the
...
applicant for a patent through which he deliberately and
without excuse postpones . . . the beginning of his monopoly,
and thus puts off the free public enjoyment of the useful
invention, is an evasion of the statute and defeats its
benevolent aim." 70 The Court acknowledged that a specially
63. 263 U.S. 50, 56 (1923).
64. Id. at 52.
65. Id. at 53.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 55 (describing the plan adopted by Congress in exercise of the
power granted by the Constitution and discussing the "legislative intent that
...at the end of [the patent term], the public might derive . . . knowledge
sufficient to enable it freely to make and use the invention").
68. For purposes of analyzing prosecution laches, the phrase "intervening
rights" refers to other inventors who independently made the same advances
in the art while the applicant delayed the issuance of his patent. Id. at 56-57
("Many inventors were at work in the same field, and had made advances in
the art, and the government had used them.").
69. Id. at 63. Although the PTO had refused to issue the patent on the
ground of abandonment, the Supreme Court held that the applicant's designed
delay constituted prosecution laches. Id. at 56-57 ("This is not a case of
abandonment. It is a case of forfeiting the right to a patent by designed
delay.").
70. Id. at 56; see also Marcus, supra note 33, at 539 (noting that the
Court's proclamation was articulated "in light of the aims behind the
constitutional grant of power and the legislature's plan for implementing these
constitutional aims").

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

1634

[Vol 87:1621

enacted law permitted this lawsuit, but held that it was not
permitted to trump the equitable doctrine of prosecution
71
laches.
One year later, in Webster Electric Co. v. Splitdorf
Electrical Co., the Court held that the doctrine of prosecution
72
laches barred patentees from asserting any patent rights.
There, the applicant filed the original application in 1910 and
filed a divisional application in 1915, which had claims copied
73
from another patent to institute an interference proceeding.
After the interference concluded, the applicant added the
claims at issue to the divisional application. 74 The Court found
that the applicant "stood by and awaited development[]" of
intervening rights during the eight years before he presented
75
the claims at issue to the PTO.
The Court analyzed the "long delay" and determined that
the applicant added the claims at issue as "an exigent
afterthought, rather than [as] a logical development of the
original application." 76 The Webster Court held that the
applicant's delay was unreasonable and gave rise to
prosecution laches, which resulted in a forfeiture of his patent
rights. 77 In a noteworthy forewarning, the Webster Court
acknowledged that patent laws should not be construed
71. See Woodbridge, 263 U.S. at 58. The special statute was specifically
enacted to allow the plaintiffs lawsuit on the condition that "the court shall
find that [the] claimant had not forfeited his right to a patent by delay or
laches or for other reasons." Id. at 56. The Court recognized that the statute
necessarily implied that there may be a forfeiture by delay or laches and held
that, in fact, the plaintiffs conduct did constitute prosecution laches. Id. A
later Supreme Court case characterized Woodbridge as holding that "the delay
of 9 years ...was laches." Overland Motor Co. v. Packard Motor Co., 274 U.S.
417, 427 (1927).
72. 264 U.S. 463, 466 (1924).
73. Id. at 464-65. When two or more inventors are seeking to patent the
same invention, the PTO must initiate an interference proceeding to
determine priority of invention. See MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 18, at 50.
As such, an applicant may instigate an interference proceeding by copying one
or more claims from another applicant's pending application or issued patent.
See, e.g., Webster, 264 U.S. at 464.
74. Webster, 264 U.S. at 465. The broader claims issued without being
subject to an interference proceeding. Id.
75.

Id.

76. Id. at 466.
77. Id. ("We have no hesitation in saying that the delay was unreasonable,
and, under the circumstances shown by the record, constitutes laches . . .");
see also Eschweiler, supra note 33, at 406 (stating that the Court was
"concerned with the 'reasonableness' of the delay" and not necessarily the
interference proceedings between the same parties unrelated to the case).
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narrowly to discourage creative genius, but more importantly,
that a loose interpretation of the patent laws may subvert the
intended limitations so as to "bring about an undue extension
of the patent monopoly against private and public rights."78
Finally, the Court established a firm two-year limit for an
applicant to file a continuation or divisional application.7 9
Much of the pre-1952 continuation practice was judicially
created, so the judicial creation of the two-year time limit in
Webster was not an affront to any act of Congress. ° Such a
heavy-handed rule, however, was not equitable in all cases, and
the Court faced this problem in Crown Cork & Seal Co. v.
Ferdinand Gutmann Co.8 1 There, the applicant filed an
original application that claimed a process and, three years
later, filed a divisional application that claimed the resulting
product.8 2 More than two years after the original application
issued with process claims, the applicant filed a second
divisional (stemming from the initial divisional) that claimed a
second process. 83 The defendant argued that the delay in filing
the second divisional constituted laches under Webster, but the
patentee urged that there was no intervening adverse use of
84
the second process before the filing of the second divisional.
The Crown Cork Court distinguished Webster, without
overruling it, by noting that the Webster applicant "stood by
and awaited development[]" of intervening adverse rights while
delaying the prosecution of the claims at issue.8 5 In Crown
Cork, however, there was no evidence before the Court that

78.

Webster, 264 U.S. at 466.

79. Id. at 471 (holding that "the two-year time limit prima facie applies to
divisional

applications

and can

only be

avoided

by proof of special

circumstances justifying a longer delay").
80.

See infra notes 94-100 and accompanying text.

81. 304 U.S. 159, 160-61 (1938). The issue before the court was framed as
follows: "Does this Court's decision in Webster . . . mean that, even in the
absence of intervening adverse rights, an excuse must be shown for a lapse of

more than two years in presenting claims in a divisional application?" Id.
(emphasis added). The Crown Cork Court deliberately limited its holding to
this question only. Id. at 168.
82.
83.
84.

Id. at 162-63.
Id.
Id. at 164. The trial court agreed with the patentee that no adverse

use existed. Id.
85. Id. at 166 (noting that the Webster Court looked to the intervening
rights during the prosecution delay before applying the doctrine of prosecution
laches).
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such conduct existed. 86 Because the existence of intervening
adverse rights was an important equitable factor in Webster,
the Crown Cork Court was not compelled to follow the Webster
holding.87 As such, the Court held that, regardless of Webster's
two-year time limit, prosecution laches does not apply "in the
absence of intervening adverse rights."8 8
The Supreme Court handed down its decision in General
Talking Pictures Corp. v. Western Electric Co. on the same day
as Crown Cork. 89 As in Crown Cork, the General Talking
Pictures Court distinguished Webster and held that the twoyear time limit for filing continuation applications did not
apply in absence of intervening adverse rights. 90
The Supreme Court precedents before 1952 established, at
the very least, the certain existence of the prosecution laches
defense. 9 1 Although Crown Cork and General Talking Pictures
may have limited Webster's firm time limit after which
prosecution laches would apply, neither case rejected the
existence of the defense. 92 These cases,93however, represent the
Supreme Court's last word on the topic.

86. Id. at 164 (describing how the district court found no adverse use of
the invention prior to the second process claims).
87.

Id. at 167-68.

88. Id. ("It is clear that, in the absence of intervening adverse rights, the
decision in [Webster] does not mean that an excuse must be shown for a lapse
of more than two years in presenting the divisional application."). Even the
dissenting opinion acknowledged the majority holding as requiring "proof of
'intervening adverse rights."' Id. at 169. One scholar summarized Crown
Cork to hold that "unreasonable delay in patent prosecution may trigger

laches, however no applicant will be subject to an arbitrary time frame, but
rather each case will be decided on its particular facts." Eschweiler, supra
note 33, at 407.
89. See 304 U.S. 175, 183 (1938), affd on reh'g, 305 U.S. 124 (1938).
90. Id. (holding that the Webster time limit did not apply to these
continuation applications "[iun the absence of intervening adverse rights"

(emphasis added)).
91. Supra notes 63-90 and accompanying text.
92.

See Eschweiler, supra note 33, at 408 (concluding that the pre-1952

case law "supports a contention that a court has the authority in equity to
render a valid patent unenforceable for 'unreasonable delay' in prosecution");
supra notes 81-90 and accompanying text; see also Marcus, supra note 33, at
534-60 (offering an extensive history of the Supreme Court case law relating to
prosecution laches).
93. Marcus, supra note 33, at 534.
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2. Congressional Codification: The 1952 Patent Act
In 1952, Congress enacted the first major patent reform
since 1874.94 Congress intended the 1952 Patent Act to "revise
and codify the laws relating to patents," which shows that some
portions of the Act were intended to legislatively correct specific
statutory and judicially created laws as they existed before
1952. 95 For example, paragraph six of § 112 was codified to
affirmatively overrule a prior Supreme Court opinion that
frowned upon the use of means-plus-function language in
96
patent claims.
In contrast, Congress did not affirmatively overrule the
doctrine of prosecution laches established by the Supreme
Court when crafting provisions related to continuation and
divisional applications. 97 Indeed, the Senate Report that
accompanied the 1952 Patent Act summarizes the impact of
§§ 120 and 121, which relate to continuation and divisional
applications, in a single sentence: "Sections 120 and 121
express in the statute certain matters which exist in the law
today but which had not before been written into the statute,
and in so doing make some minor changes in the concepts

94. P. J. Federico, Commentary on the New PatentAct, 35 U.S.C.A. (1952),
at 24, reprinted in 75 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'y 161, 165-66 (1993)
(noting that the last general revision of the patent laws before the 1952 Patent
Act "was the Act of July 8, 1870," which eventually culminated in the Revised
Statutes of 1874). Although Federico's after-the-fact commentary is not an
official form of legislative history, the Federal Circuit has cited it as
persuasive authority from one of the original drafters of the 1952 Patent Act.
See, e.g., A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides Constr. Co., 960 F.2d 1020, 1029
(Fed. Cir. 1992) (en banc).
95. S.REP. No. 82-1979, at 1 (1952), reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2394,
2394. Notably, the drafters did not intend the codification to be all
encompassing so as to overrule any particular case law that was not
specifically addressed in the text or history of the new Act. Federico, supra
note 94, at 162. Federico, one of the original drafters of the Act, admitted that
"[wihile patents are creatures of statute, the entire body of patent law is much
fuller than the statute itself, including a vast amount of case material." Id.
96. Ronald D. Hantman, Why Not the Statute? Revisited, 83 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. SOCY 685, 692 (2001) ("Section 112,
6 and § 271 were
enacted in the 1952 law for the first time. Section 271 was simply a
codification of existing law while § 112, 6 was said to be enacted to overrule
Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Walker[, 329 U.S. 1 (1946)]."); see also
Deron Burton, Comment, Bridging Theory into Practice:PredictableScope for
FunctionPatent Claims, 42 UCLA L. REV. 221, 236 (1994).
97. See Eschweiler, supra note 33, at 411-13 (noting that § 120 was
merely a codification of the then-present continuation practice and not
regarded as "blazing new trails in patent law").
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involved." 98 In describing § 120 by itself, the Senate Report
states, again in a single sentence, "This section represents
present law not expressed in the statute, except for the added
requirement that the first application must be specifically
mentioned in the second."99 Thus, neither the text nor the
legislative history of § 120 demonstrate an intent to overrule or
change any existing Supreme Court precedent regarding
continuation practice. 100
Congress encoded the doctrine of laches and other
equitable defenses into the 1952 Patent Act,10 1 just as it had
encoded the judicially created continuation practice. 10 2 While
discussing the drafters' intent behind item one of § 282, P. J.
Federico, one of the Act's original drafters, 10 3 stated that "this
would include . .. equitable defenses such as laches, estoppel
and unclean hands."1 0 4 Congress did not foresee a significant
change in the available defenses to infringement. 10 5 Instead,
the legislative history shows that § 282 simply added "a
in general terms"
broader paragraph specifying defenses
10 6
without eliminating any existing law.
3. After the Dust Has Settled: The Modern Viability of the
Prosecution Laches Defense
Even though the 1952 Patent Act did not expressly
overrule precedent establishing the doctrine of prosecution
laches, the doctrine's opponents draw attention to the absence
of any statutory limits on the number of continuations that an
10 7
applicant can file or on the duration of prosecution.
Relatively soon after the codification of the patent laws, some
courts-including one predecessor court to the Federal
98. S. REP. No. 82-1979, at 6 (1952), reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2394,
2400.
99. Id. app. at 20, reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2394 app. at 2413.
100. Id.; see also 35 U.S.C. § 120 (2000).
101. See 35 U.S.C. § 282; Federico, supra note 94, at 215.
102. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
103. See supra note 94.
104. Federico, supra note 94, at 215.
105. S. REP. No. 82-1979 app. at 29 (1952), reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2394 app. at 2422.
106. Id., reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2394 app. at 2422.

107. See, e.g., Haney v. Timesavers, Inc., 900 F. Supp. 1378, 1382 (D. Or.
1995) (agreeing with the plaintiffs argument that "35 U.S.C. § 120 expressly
permits [the plaintiff-patentee] to file additional applications to obtain
additional claims"), clarifiedby 1995 WL 747460, at *1 (D. Or. Dec. 6, 1995).
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Circuit-adhered to pre-1952 Supreme Court precedent by
applying the doctrine of prosecution laches.1 08
Shortly
thereafter, however, another predecessor court to the Federal
Circuit rejected arbitrary limits upon the number of
continuation applications that an applicant may file. 10 9 In In re
Henriksen, the examiner rejected the applicant's continuation
application, which was the most recent in a chain of seven
applications, on the ground that the great-great-great
grandparent application was anticipatory prior art. 110 The
examiner reasoned that an effective filing date should be
limited to a chain of three applications, so the applicant could
not claim priority to an ancestor application that is more than
three generations removed.'1 1 The Henriksen court relied on
§ 120 and its legislative history to hold that "the statute
provides no limit to the number of applications that may be
copending.""12 Although the court thoroughly interpreted the
statute with respect to continuations, it did not speak to the
issue of equitable defenses, such as prosecution laches, in light
13
of the entirety of the applicant's conduct.
Before 2002, the Federal Circuit addressed prosecution
laches on only rare occasions, never establishing a precedential
rule. In 1986, the court upheld a finding, under the clear error
standard, that an applicant had not been guilty of prosecution
laches in Studiengesellschaft Kohle v. Northern Petrochemical
Co. 114 The patent at issue was granted in 1978 and claimed
priority to an application originally filed in 1955.115 The
108. See, e.g., Pratt & Whitney Co. v. United States, 345 F.2d 838, 843-44
(Ct. Cl. 1965) (finding no satisfactory explanation for the applicant's delay in

presenting claims to the Patent Office and "following the decision in the
Webster case [to find] the claims invalid due to laches").
109. In re Henriksen, 399 F.2d 253, 254 (C.C.P.A. 1968).
110. Id. at 254-55.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 261.
113. The Henriksen court addressed the "deplorable state of affairs" in
patent law that a patent may claim priority to a twenty-year-old application.
Id. at 262. As policy matter, the court stated that "the cure . . .rests with
Congress, not with us." Id. Immediately after making this statement, the
court muddied the waters by holding that "[ilf a restriction is to be imposed, it
must be based upon law, legislatively or judicially expressed." Id. (emphasis
added) (leaving open the possibility that a judicially created law, such as
prosecution laches, may impose some limit on the continuation practice).
114. 784 F.2d 351, 356 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
115. Id. at 352-53. Even though the applicant at issue had overcome the
examiner's rejections in 1960, a series of interference proceedings delayed the
patent's issuance. Id. at 356.
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district court found that the delay in prosecution "resulted in
large part from circumstances in the" PTO and that the
applicant's "response thereto involved no deliberate or
calculated delay." 116 The Northern Petrochemical court found
no error in the lower court's conclusion, and more importantly,
the Federal Circuit's precedential opinion did not reject the
existence of the prosecution laches defense, which the
1 17
defendant had specifically raised.
Two years later, the Federal Circuit in Bott v. Four Star
Corp., a non-precedential opinion, refused to adopt "equitable
safeguards" to limit the continuation practice as established by
the 1952 Patent Act."18 Although the Bott court did not
mention prosecution laches, that defense was implied by the
defendant's reliance upon Webster and Crown Cork. 119 Using
somewhat backward reasoning, the Bott court did not look for
something in the legislative history that overruled the pre-1952
precedents, but instead it searched the legislative record for
affirmative evidence that these precedents should have
In addition, this non-precedential
continued viability.1 20
interpretation of § 120's legislative history may be severely
weakened by the Federal Circuit's later (precedential)
interpretation of that section:
The legislative history of section 120 does not indicate any
congressional intent to alter the Supreme Court's interpretation of
continuing application practice. The Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals (CCPA), a predecessor of this court, acknowledged that the
state of the law regarding continuing application practice had not
been changed by the enactment of section 120 ...."

More than a decade after Bott, the Federal Circuit
addressed an issue that is somewhat similar to prosecution

116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Nos. 88-1117, 88-1118, 1988 WL 54107, at *1 (Fed. Cir. May 26, 1988).
119. Id.
120. Id. ("[W]e have not been directed to anything in the legislative history
of the 1952 Act that supports [the defendant's] contention that the equitable
considerations discussed in the Supreme Court cases should have continued
viability."). Because prosecution laches was embedded in patent law before
the 1952 Patent Act, the court's expectation that Congress should list each
precedent that had continued viability after the Act seems unrealistic,
especially in light of the legislative intent with respect to § 120 to represent
'present law not expressed in the statute." See supra notes 94-106 and
accompanying text.
121. Transco Prods., Inc. v. Performance Contracting, Inc., 38 F.3d 551,
557 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
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laches in another non-precedential opinion in Ricoh Co. v.
Nashua Corp.122 The defendant in Ricoh raised an equitable
defense of intervening rights in the context of a continuation
application, which is essentially the defense of prosecution
laches.123 As a result, the court stated that the defense of
intervening rights was reserved for cases involving reissue
applications and that filing broader claims in a continuation
application to encompass a competitor's product was
permissible. 24 As in Bott, the Ricoh court refused to adopt
"equitable safeguards" in the absence of congressional
indication that intervening rights should be applied in the
125
context of continuation applications.
In sum, the case law surrounding the doctrine of
prosecution laches digressed into an uncertain condition after
the 1952 Patent Act. Although some early cases directly
applied Supreme Court precedent to invoke the equitable
doctrine, other cases refused to restrict the number of
continuation applications that may be chained together over
time. 126 The only precedential case from the Federal Circuit on
this issue acknowledged that the defense existed, but the court
simply affirmed that the applicant's conduct in that case did
not constitute prosecution laches. 127 More recent Federal
Circuit opinions rejected the notion of equitable safeguards to
limit continuation applications without an affirmative act from
Congress.1 28 Those opinions, however, are non-precedential
and carry no authority upon which subsequent courts may
29
rely.

122. No. 97-1344, 1999 WL 88969, at *2 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 18, 1999).
123. Id.
In general, the defense of intervening rights applies in cases
involving reissue applications. See 35 U.S.C. § 252 (2000).
124. Ricoh, 1999 WL 88969, at *3.
125. Id. Interestingly, the Ricoh court was looking for Congress to adopt a

new law on equitable safeguards in the context of continuation applications,
but the legislative history of § 120 shows that the 1952 Congress did in fact
adopt the continuation practice as established by judicial precedent, which
included the equitable doctrine of prosecution laches. See supra notes 94-106

and accompanying text.
126. See supra notes 108-13 and accompanying text.
127. See supra notes 114-17 and accompanying text.
128. See supra notes 118-25 and accompanying text.
129.

See FED. CIR. R. 47.6(b).
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II. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT ANSWERS THE CALL FOR
PRECEDENT: SYMBOL TECHNOLOGIES, INC. v.
LEMELSON MEDICAL, EDUCATION &
RESEARCH FOUNDATION
Less than eighteen months after the non-precedential
Ricoh decision, the Federal Circuit granted a petition for
interlocutory appeal to address the issue of prosecution laches
directly. 130 The interlocutory appeal arose from a declaratory
judgment action initiated by Symbol Technologies in the
District of Nevada to declare Lemelson's "machine vision"
patents unenforceable due to prosecution laches.' 31 The district
court granted the Lemelson Foundation's motion to dismiss the
prosecution laches defense, relying on District of Nevada
precedent. 132 Due to the confusion surrounding the doctrine of
prosecution laches since the 1952 Patent Act, the district court
certified its order to the Federal Circuit, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1292(b), as "involving a controlling question of law as to
which there was a substantial ground for difference of
opinion." 133 Under § 1292(b), by granting the interlocutory
appeal, the Federal Circuit had complete discretion in
determining whether to grant or deny Symbol Technologies's
petition.134 This hinted that the Federal Circuit was preparing
to establish a precedential rule on the doctrine of prosecution
135
laches.
130. Symbol Techs., Inc. v. Lemelson Med., Educ. & Research Found., 243
F.3d 558, 558 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (unpublished table decision) (granting an
interlocutory appeal on the issue of prosecution laches), explained at 2000 WL
1300430, at *1 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 1, 2000), considered at 277 F.3d 1361, 1363
(Fed. Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 123 S.Ct. 113 (2002).
131. Symbol Techs., Inc. v. Lemelson Med., Educ. & Research Found., No.
99CV0397, 2000 WL 33709453, at *1, *3 (D. Nev. Mar. 21, 2000) (describing
that the fourth count of the complaint involved the doctrine of prosecution
laches), rev'd, 277 F.3d 1361, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 123 S.Ct. 113
(2002). The sixteen patents-in-suit issued between 1978 and 1994, yet all of
them claimed some sort of priority to original applications filed in 1954 and
1956. See supra note 53 (listing and describing the sixteen patents at issue).
132. Symbol Techs., 2000 WL 33709453, at *6 (agreeing with a prior
District of Nevada case involving Lemelson's patents and holding that "[i]t is
therefore improper to introduce the equitable doctrine of laches into the
statutory scheme of continuation practice"); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6)
(describing a motion to dismiss for "failure of the pleading to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted").
133. Symbol Techs., 2000 WL 1300430, at *1.
134. Id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (2000).
135. See, e.g., Varchaver, supra note 1, at 216 (describing the importance of
the "mid-case appeal" and noting that the "remaining Lemelson litigation has
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In Symbol Technologies, Inc. v. Lemelson Medical,
Education & Research Foundation, the sole issue facing the
Federal Circuit was "whether, as a matter of law, the equitable
doctrine of laches may be applied to bar enforcement of patent
claims that issued after an unreasonable and unexplained
delay in prosecution even though the applicant complied with
pertinent statutes and rules."1 36 The Symbol Technologies
court held that prosecution laches could bar enforcement of
such delayed patent claims and reversed the lower court's
137
decision to dismiss the prosecution laches count.
Chief Judge Mayer, writing for the majority,13 8 began with
a description of the prosecution laches origin in pre-1952
Supreme Court precedents, such as Woodbridge, Webster,
Crown Cork, and General Talking Pictures.139 The Symbol
Technologies court concluded that all of the Supreme Court
cases, along with pre-1952 patent law treatises, "evinced the
existence of prosecution laches." 140 After laying the groundwork
for the pre-1952 existence of prosecution laches, the majority
addressed the Lemelson Foundation's three arguments that the
141
defense is no longer available.
First, the Lemelson Foundation argued that the
prosecution laches rule from Webster and its progeny was
limited to claims arising out of interference proceedings. 142 In
particular, the Lemelson Foundation argued, Crown Cork
removed the possibility of using the defense outside of the
interference context. 143 The Symbol Technologies court rejected
this argument for two reasons. First, the patent claims at issue

been stayed in anticipation of' the Federal Circuit's holding).
136.

277 F.3d 1361, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 113

(2002).
137.
138.

Id. at 1364-65, 1368.
The Federal Circuit panel consisted of Chief Judge Mayer, Circuit

Judge Clevenger, and Circuit Judge Newman. Id. at 1362.

Circuit Judge

Newman filed a dissenting opinion. Id.
139. Id. at 1364-65; see also supra Part I.C.1 (discussing these four
Supreme Court cases). The Symbol Technologies court noted the importance
of "intervening adverse rights" in its discussion of Webster and Crown Cork.
Id. at 1365; see also supra notes 85-88 and accompanying text (discussing the
Court's rationale in distinguishing Crown Cork from Webster).
140. Symbol Techs., 277 F.3d at 1365 (emphasis added).

141. Id. at 1365-68 (listing the three reasons asserted by the Lemelson
Foundation and addressing each one in turn).
142. Id. at 1365.
143. Id.
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in Webster were never involved in an interference proceeding.144
Instead, the Webster Court emphasized the unreasonableness
of the applicant's delay. 145 Second, a thorough reading of
Crown Cork supports the existence of prosecution laches while
146
curbing the firm two-year time limit espoused in Webster.
According to the majority, the Crown Cork holding did not set
out to limit the prosecution laches defense to cases involving
interferences, but instead, Crown Cork and General Talking
Pictures eliminated the two-year time limit established in
147
Webster.
The Lemelson Foundation's second argument was that the
plain language of §§ 120 and 121 of the 1952 Patent Act barred
the prosecution laches defense. 148 The majority agreed with the
Lemelson Foundation that these sections are "the backbone for
the modern continuation and division practice," but it rejected
the notion that the passage of these sections eliminated the
prosecution laches defense. 149 The majority relied on the 1952
Act's legislative history to show that the prosecution laches
defense coexisted with the continuation practice and that
Congress did not intend to alter the Supreme Court's
interpretation of the continuing application practice. 150
Furthermore, the majority cited Federico's commentary to show
that § 282 of the Act actually incorporated the prosecution
15
laches defense. 1
Finally, the Lemelson Foundation pointed to the Bott and
Ricoh non-precedential opinions, which refused to apply
equitable safeguards to the continuation practice, and insisted
that these opinions be binding upon the Federal Circuit. 152 The
majority rejected the reasoning of a recent Eighth Circuit case,

144.
145.
146.

Id.
Id.
Id.; see also supra note 88 and accompanying text (discussing the

relevance of intervening adverse rights to the application of prosecution
laches).
147.
148.
149.

Symbol Techs., 277 F.3d at 1365.
Id.
Id. at 1365-66.

150. Id. at 1366.
151. Id. (citing Federico as one of the Act's original drafters whose
commentary "is an invaluable insight into the intentions of the drafters" and
calling particular attention to Federico, supra note 94); see also supra notes
103-04 and accompanying text.
152. Symbol Techs., 277 F.3d at 1366-67, 1370; see also supra notes 118-29
and accompanying text.
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which held that a rule permitting unpublished opinions to be
nonbinding upon future courts violated Article III of the
Constitution. 153
Instead, the Symbol Technologies court
adopted the logic of a Ninth Circuit case that refuted the
Eighth Circuit's approach on the ground that accurate
publications of issued opinions were not available until decades
after Article III was drafted, but non-precedential opinions
154
existed before 1787 without concern from the framers.
Because the Bott and Ricoh opinions were non-precedential, the
Symbol Technologies court treated them as such and declined
to consider them as binding.155
The dissent, authored by Judge Newman, rested on the
principle that equitable doctrines should not interfere with
statutory provisions. 156 As such, Judge Newman disagreed that
the equitable doctrine of prosecution laches should
retrospectively deprive an applicant of property rights even
though he fully complied with the statutory procedures of the
continuation practice. 157 Her opinion did not fully embrace the
Lemelson Foundation's argument that Crown Cork limited
prosecution laches to interference proceedings, 158 but Judge
153. Id. at 1367 (refusing to adopt the holding of Anastasoff v. United
States, 223 F.3d 898, 899 (8th Cir. 2000), vacated as moot, 235 F.3d 1054, 1056
(8th Cir. 2000) (en banc)). The court maintained that "Anastasoffs restrictive
view of the Framer's [sic] notions of precedent is far greater than was even
possible at the relevant time period." Id.
154. Id. (embracing the "comprehensive, scholarly treatment of the issue"
in Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1160 (9th Cir. 2001), and holding that
"Article III of the Constitution does not contain an express prohibition on
issuing non-precedential opinions").
155. Id. at 1368 (stating that non-precedential opinions "merely permit a
judgment about whether a case contributes significantly to the body of law"
and refusing to "consider the non-precedential cases cited by Lemelson").
156. Id. at 1368-69 (Newman, J., dissenting).
157. Id. at 1371 (Newman, J., dissenting). Judge Newman asserted that
"[hieretofore, there has been no cause of action whereby a patentee who fully
complied with the statute and rules must nonetheless defend the charge that
he should have done more than the statute and rules require." Id. at 1368.
This assertion, however, ignores the Federal Circuit's rule that a patentee
may be subjected to a traditional laches defense even though the patentee
fully complied with the pertinent statutes and seeks damages for less than the
prior six years of infringement. A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides Constr.
Co., 960 F.2d 1020, 1034-35 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (en banc); see 35 U.S.C. § 286
(2000).
158. Symbol Techs., 277 F.3d at 1369 (Newman, J., dissenting). Judge
Newman attempted to distinguish the precedent established in Woodbridge by
stating that "surely this is not 'laches."' Id. This view, however, is
inconsistent with Woodbridge's language and its subsequent Supreme Court
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Newman did agree that the 1952 Patent Act eliminated any
possibility that the prosecution laches defense existed. 159 In
addition, her dissent adopted the reasoning of Bott and Ricoh,
although not referring to these cases as binding. 160 Judge
Newman also argued that the majority's acceptance of
prosecution laches accomplishes a retroactive effect that
1 61
Congress previously rejected.
III. WHAT NOW? THE LEGITIMACY OF SYMBOL
TECHNOLOGIES AND THE MEANING OF
"UNREASONABLE AND UNEXPLAINED DELAY'
A.

THE NECESSARY AND APPROPRIATE OUTCOME

The majority's conclusion that prosecution laches is a valid
defense was not only proper, but was in fact necessitated by the
Supreme Court precedent and the clear congressional intent to
maintain the status quo of the pre-1952 continuation
practice. 162 The Symbol Technologies court's interpretation of
Webster and Crown Cork is decidedly consistent with that of
other scholars. 163 Even the dissent in Symbol Technologies did
not adopt the Lemelson Foundation's misconstruction of these
early Supreme Court cases. 164 Furthermore, the history of the
applications. See supra note 71 and accompanying text. Moreover, Judge
Newman did not describe Crown Cork as limiting the laches defense to
interference proceedings, but rather asserted that Crown Cork eliminated the
two-year "requirement" set forth in Webster. Symbol Techs., 277 F.3d at 1369
(Newman, J., dissenting).
159. Symbol Techs., 277 F.3d at 1369 (Newman, J., dissenting) (noting that
Congress chose not to set time limits on the use of continuation applications).
160. Id. at 1370 (Newman, J., dissenting). Interestingly, the majority
opinion never formally cited Bott or Ricoh, and Judge Newman commented
that discussion of these opinions was permitted only on a motion from the
Lemelson Foundation. Id. at 1370 & n.2.
161. Id. at 1371 n.3 (Newman, J., dissenting). In response to the Uruguay
round of General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade, Congress amended the
patent laws, limiting all future patent terms to twenty years from the earliest
effective filing date. Id.; see also supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text.
This amendment, however, did not apply to patents that issued from
applications filed on or before June 8, 1995. Symbol Techs., 277 F.3d at 1371
n.3 (Newman, J., dissenting).
162. See supra notes 63-93, 101-06 and accompanying text.
163. See, e.g., Eschweiler, supra note 33, at 404-08 (discussing Webster and
Crown Cork and concluding that pre-1952 precedents permitted a court to
render a valid patent unenforceable for unreasonable delay in prosecution); see
Marcus, supra note 33, at 534-60 (tracing the development of the prosecution
laches defense by analyzing pre-1952 Supreme Court cases).
164. See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
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1952 Patent Act evinces no instruction or belief that the
codified laws eliminated the Supreme Court's well-established
precedents relating to prosecution laches. 165 The Symbol
Technologies court correctly rejected the Lemelson Foundation's argument that the plain text of § 120 eliminated the
prosecution laches defense and held that Congress did not
intend to endorse the continuation practice at the expense of
66
prosecution laches. 1
The Symbol Technologies court, however, did not discuss
the important constitutional implications of rejecting the
prosecution laches defense. 167 According to the dissent's
interpretation of the pertinent statutes, a patentee may
intentionally and secretly delay the issuance of patent
claims. 168 That patentee may then allow the claims to issue
and sue the innovators who independently developed the
claimed invention decades earlier, introduced the technology
for public use, and spurred further innovation. 169 Because the
constitutional authority for Congress to enact the patent laws
requires a purpose to "promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts," one must question Judge Newman's interpretation
of those pertinent statutes. 170 Such an interpretation of the
patent laws, which encourages an applicant to "submarine" an
industry, "would materially retard the progress of science and
the useful arts, and give a premium to those who should be

165. See supra notes 97-100 and accompanying text.
166. See supra notes 148-51 and accompanying text.
167. See Marcus, supra note 33, at 525 (describing the practice of
"submarine" patents as "a significant abuse of... patent law" and stating that

"[tihis state of affairs cannot be... what the founding fathers intended").
168.

See supra note 157.

Judge Newman may be correct in stating that

Lemelson did not violate any statutes, but inequities suffered as a result of
Lemelson's unusually prolonged delay are no secret. See supra notes 51-56
and accompanying text.

169. Even though Lemelson and his attorney candidly added claims
directed to bar-code technology decades after filing the original application,
Lemelson was able to extract large royalties from those who actually
contributed to bar-code development.
See supra notes 55-56 and

accompanying text. Judge Newman, however, found that Lemelson's conduct
was somehow justified by the patent laws. Symbol Techs., 277 F.3d at 1369-70

(Newman, J., dissenting) ("The only charge is that, despite full compliance
with statute and regulation, [Lemelson] took too long to present his claims.").
170.

See supra note

16

and

accompanying

text.

In

light

of the

Constitutional mandate, it is difficult to understand how the patent laws could
not only encourage conduct that hinders progress, but also prevent an
innovator from raising a known defense to such conduct.

1648

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol 87:1621

least prompt to communicate their discoveries." 171
Although the ultimate conclusion of the Symbol
Technologies court was well reasoned, the court provided little
guidance on how to apply the doctrine. Adding to this
predicament, the doctrine of prosecution laches will likely be a
new ground for litigation after Symbol Technologies's nod of
approval (and the Supreme Court's refusal to grant certiorari to
the Lemelson Foundation's petition). 172 Within eight months of
the Symbol Technologies holding, several district court cases,
and at least one Federal Circuit case, have dealt with the
doctrine of prosecution laches.173 At least one court has
observed that "the Federal Circuit's laches defense, and what
action constitutes an 'unreasonable and unexplained delay,' has
yet to be fleshed out through application." 174 Future courts
should consider Supreme Court precedent, the Symbol
Technologies case, and the Federal Circuit's law regarding the
traditional form of laches to formulate a practical prosecution
175
laches defense test.
B. THE PRUDENT RULE FOR ANALYZING PROSECUTION LACHES
Before setting forth the test for determining whether a
court should act in equity to apply the doctrine of prosecution
laches, the general principles of applying prosecution laches
must be outlined.
Under Federal Circuit precedent, the
equitable determination of laches is a matter "committed to the
171.

Pennockv. Dialogue, 27 U.S. 1, 19 (1829).

172.

See supra note 15 and accompanying text; infra note 174.

173. See In re Bogese, 303 F.3d 1362, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (extending the
Symbol Technologies holding to permit the PTO to reject pending applications
based on prosecution laches); Intuitive Surgical, Inc. v. Computer Motion, Inc.,
No. 01-203-SLR, 2002 WL 31833867, at *3-*6 (D. Del. Dec. 10, 2002)
(construing the Symbol Technologies case and concluding that the disputed

delay in prosecution did not give rise to the prosecution laches defense); Ford
Oxaal v. Internet Pictures Corp., No. OOCV1863LEKDRH, 2002 WL 485704, at

*2 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2002) (granting the defendant's motion to amend its
answer based on the Symbol Technologies court's validation of the prosecution

laches defense); Digital Control Inc. v. McLaughlin Mfg. Co., 225 F. Supp. 2d
1224, 1226-29 (W.D. Wash. 2002) (discussing the Symbol Technologies case in

detail and holding that the defendant failed to show, as a matter of law, that
the plaintiffs delay was unreasonable and unexplained).
174. Digital Control, 225 F. Supp. 2d at 1226; see also Intuitive Surgical,
2002 WL 31833867, at *3 (noting the Symbol Technologies holding and stating
that "[u]nfortunately, neither Congress nor the Federal Circuit has provided
any further guidance on the legal standards applicable to the prosecution
laches defense").
175. See infra Parts II.B-III.
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sound discretion of the" trial judge, and laches "must have
flexibility in its application." 176
Terminology such as
"discretion" and "flexibility" often gives rise to doomsday
predictions of massive litigation rendering many patents
unenforceable, such as Judge Newman's prediction that the
prosecution laches defense will subject "patents to a new source
of satellite litigation of unforeseen scope." 177 In addition,
opponents of the prosecution laches doctrine contend that it
will end a prevalent practice of "commercial gamesmanship,"
endorsed by the Federal Circuit in State Industries,Inc. v. A. 0.
Smith Corp., whereby the practitioner amends pending claims
to cover a competitor's newly marketed product. 78 These
contentions, however, are easily put to rest by the guiding
principle that actual proof of unreasonable delay and prejudice
to the defendant does not mandate recognition of a laches
defense in every case. 179 Instead, such proof of unreasonable
delay and prejudice 80merely lays a foundation for the court's
potential discretion. 1
Most importantly, application of prosecution laches bars all
relief for the patentee by rendering the patent claims
unenforceable, and laches may be applied to bar all relief "only
in egregious circumstances." 181 Thus, even if an accused
176. A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides Constr. Co., 960 F.2d 1020, 1032
(Fed. Cir. 1992) (en banc).
177. Symbol Techs., Inc. v. Lemelson Med., Educ. & Research Found., 277
F.3d 1361, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (Newman, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 123 S.
Ct. 113 (2002).
178. 751 F.2d 1226, 1235-36 (Fed. Cir. 1985). "Commercial gamesmanship"
occurs where one competitor tries to design around a second competitor's
patent, and the second competitor manipulates "its secret pending application
to cover the functionally competitive structure." Id. In State Industries,A.O.
Smith marketed a new water heater designed to avoid State Industries's
patent. Id. at 1234-35. In response, State Industries added new claims to its
pending continuation application to cover A.O. Smith's new water heater. Id.
at 1235-36. The Federal Circuit refused to eliminate such "commercial
gamesmanship" from the patent prosecution practice. Id. at 1236; see also
Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 874 (Fed.
Cir. 1988) ("[N]or is it ... improper to amend or insert claims intended to
cover a competitor's product [that] the applicant's attorney has learned about
during the prosecution of a patent application.").
179. Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1036.
180. Id. To further restrict the application of prosecution laches, the
Federal Circuit has held that the party asserting laches bears the burden of
persuasion at all times. Id. at 1038.
181. Id. at 1040 (emphasis added); see also In re Bogese, 303 F.3d 1362,
1366, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (quoting the PTO's finding that the conduct of the
applicant was "so egregious in defeating the policy of the patent laws ... as to
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infringer factually proves that, the unreasonable delay in
prosecution of the patent claims results in prejudice, the judge
must weigh the facts in equity to determine if the
to bar all relief and
circumstances are sufficiently "egregious"
82
render the patent unenforceable.
Proceeding now to the test for determining whether to
apply prosecution laches, a court must consider two critical
183
factual requisites: "unreasonable delay and prejudice."
Although a determination of laches is not made upon the
application of "mechanical rules," the particular facts and
circumstances of each case must be used to analyze several
factors. With respect to prosecution laches, these factors may
be analyzed in a two-part test. First, in determining prejudice,
courts examine the detriment to the party asserting the defense
that would result if the patent claims are not equitably
barred. 184 Second, application of prosecution laches requires a
showing of "unreasonable and unexplained delay" in
is the cause
prosecution of the patent claims and that the delay
85
of the prejudice now facing the adverse party.1
C. DETERMINING "PREJUDICE" FOR PURPOSES OF PROSECUTION
LACHES

1. The Requirement of Intervening Adverse Rights
The Symbol Technologies court's interpretation of Webster
and Crown Cork emphasized the importance of "intervening

be presumed unreasonable" and holding that the PTO did not err in rejecting
the applicant's claims (emphasis added)).
182. Skeptics may assert that prosecution laches might render some
credible patent claims unenforceable. The Federal Circuit, however, has
already spoken to that issue:
"Laches is a clement doctrine. It assures that old grievances will
some day be laid to rest, . . . that those against whom claims are
presented will not be unduly prejudiced by delay in asserting them.
Inevitably it means that some potentially meritorious demands will
not be entertained. But there is justice too in an end to conflict and in
the quiet of peace."
Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1029 (emphasis added) (quoting Envtl. Def. Fund v.
Alexander, 614 F.2d 474, 481 (5th Cir. 1980)).
183. Hall v. Aqua Queen Mfg., 93 F.3d 1548, 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
184. See infra Part III.C.
185. See supra notes 136-37 and accompanying text (referring to the
Symbol Technologies court's required showing of an "unreasonable and
unexplained delay" for prosecution laches to apply); infra Part III.D.
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adverse rights." 18 6 In addition, the Symbol Technologies court
held that the 1952 Patent Act maintained the defense of
prosecution laches as it existed in the pre-1952 Supreme Court
precedents.5 7 Looking to Webster, where the Court held the
patent claims at issue unenforceable due to prosecution laches,
the Supreme Court found that before the applicant submitted
his claims to the PTO "their subject matter was disclosed and
in general use." 188 The Webster Court found this evidence of
intervening adverse rights persuasive in its determination that
the delayed claims were "an exigent afterthought, rather than a
logical development of the original application." 8 9 Crown Cork
dealt with facts similar to Webster, where the applicant
submitted new claims years after the original application
issued as a patent. 190 The Court, however, strongly emphasized
a distinguishing feature: the absence of intervening adverse
rights. 9 1 The Crown Cork Court noted that there was no
adverse use of the claimed subject matter before the applicant
added the claims at issue, and consequently, refused to apply
192
the Webster time limit.
The Supreme Court's emphasis on intervening adverse
rights, and the Symbol Technologies court's acknowledgement
of that factor, shows the importance of intervening adverse
rights in future prosecution laches cases. A comparison of
Webster and Crown Cork provides an outline of what is meant
by "intervening adverse rights."1 93 As one scholar stated, the
Supreme Court "intended [that] phrase.., to mean use by the
public of an invention disclosed but unclaimed in a pending
application for a patent before the presentation of claims to the
PTO directed to that invention." 194 Given the Federal Circuit's
rule that laches may bar all relief only in egregious
circumstances, 195 there are few, if any, circumstances in which
prosecution laches would render patent claims unenforceable in
186.

See supra note 139.

187. See supra notes 148-51 and accompanying text.
188. See supra note 75 and accompanying text (noting that the applicant in
Webster "simply stood by and awaited developments" before initiating the
prosecution of new claims).
189. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
190. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
191. See supra notes 82-83 and accompanying text.
192. See supra notes 86-88 and accompanying text.
193. See supra notes 85-88, 187-92 and accompanying text.
194. Marcus, supra note 33, at 558.
195. See supra text accompanying notes 181-82.
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the absence of intervening adverse rights. 196 As such, proof of
this factor must be a requirement for purposes of asserting the
197
prosecution laches defense.
2. Economic Prejudice Factor
In addition to establishing intervening adverse rights,
parties asserting a prosecution laches defense may show
prejudice in terms of economic factors. 198 Economic prejudice
may arise when a party will incur damages that likely would
have been prevented if the claims were not delayed. 199 In
particular, a patent applicant may not "lie silently in wait"
when the accused infringer, "if he had notice, could have
switched to a noninfringing product." 200 Alternatively, the
accused infringer may show a loss of financial investment
caused by a change in economic position that occurred during
20
the period of delay. '
In a case where claims were allegedly delayed for decades,
such as in Symbol Technologies, a defendant has many
opportunities to show potential damages that could have been
prevented. 20 2 For example, manufacturers developed and sold
196. In the hypothetical case in which an applicant submits new claims to
the PTO to cover a disclosed but unclaimed innovation before another party's
independent development and public use of that innovation, neither the patent
laws nor equitable considerations justify denying the applicant the benefits of
a patent. Granting exclusive rights to an applicant who claims the innovation
under such circumstances does not hinder the constitutional purpose of
"promot[ing] the Progress of Science and useful Arts." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8,
cl. 8; see also supra notes 86-90 and accompanying text.
197. See supra note 139 and accompanying text. But see Digital Control
Inc. v. McLaughlin Mfg. Co., 225 F. Supp. 2d 1224, 1228-29 (W.D. Wash.
2002). In Digital Control, the court grappled with the issue of intervening
adverse rights with respect to the Symbol Technologies holding. Id. The court
properly noted that the "early Supreme Court cases indicate that, absent
intervening adverse rights, prosecution laches does not attach." Id. at 1228.
Unfortunately, the Digital Control court mistakenly adopted the definition of
intervening rights in the context of reissue patents and ultimately determined
that analysis of intervening adverse rights was not "a useful concept." Id. at
1229.
198. A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides Constr. Co., 960 F.2d 1020, 1033
(Fed. Cir. 1992) (en banc). A showing of prejudice does not require both types
of prejudice. Id. ("Such prejudice may be either economic or evidentiary."
(emphasis added)).
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. See supra notes 53, 131 and accompanying text (describing that the
sixteen contested patents in Symbol Technologies were issued between 1978
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bar-code equipment long before Lemelson initially drafted
claims to bar-code technology. 20 3 In the 1990s, however, the
Lemelson Foundation asserted that Lemelson was the rightful
inventor of these innovations and sued companies that used the
bar-code equipment. 20 4 Most likely, bar-code equipment users
could have invested in other non-infringing systems if20they
had
5
received any notice of Lemelson's newly added claims.
3. Evidentiary Prejudice Factor
A party may show prejudice, in addition to a showing of
intervening adverse rights, as a result of lost evidence.
Evidentiary prejudice may occur if the applicant's delay
prevents a party from being able to present a full and fair
defense on the merits of the case. 20 6 In general, patent lawsuits
require extensive document discovery, and many defenses
depend on evidence from a time near the effective filing date of
the application to prove the state of the art at that time. 20 7 The
passing of time may lead to the loss, either intentional or
and 1994 but were allegedly entitled to the benefit of the filing date of two
applications filed in 1954 and 1956). With an alleged delay in prosecution of
several decades, the possible loss of financial investments that proper notice
could have prevented include: purchases of capital equipment or other
businesses, investment to start a new business in a particular technology area,
investment in research and development, and many others. See, e.g., Rome
Grader & Machinery Corp. v. J.D. Adams Mfg. Co., 135 F.2d 617, 619 (7th Cir.
1943) (stating that laches could be applied where the plaintiff stood by for
many years and permitted the alleged infringer to build up a large business at
great expense, which would have become worthless if the patent claims were
enforced).
203. See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
204. See supra note 32 (describing Lemelson's mid-1990s lawsuit against
Ford Motor Company, which sought damages for Ford's use of bar-code
equipment).
205. In such a case, one court found the economic prejudice to be "obvious."
Ford Motor Co. v. Lemelson, Nos. CV-N-92-613-LDG(PHA), CV-N-92-545LDG(PHA), 1995 WL 628330, at *15 (D. Nev. June 16, 1995) (adding that the
bar-code devices "were almost certainly in development" before Lemelson
submitted his claims to the PTO). In another example, the Federal Circuit
upheld the PTO's finding that the applicant's delay of more than eight years
without a substantive amendment to advance prosecution of the claims caused
prejudice "to the public." In re Bogese, 303 F.3d 1362, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
206. A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides Constr. Co., 960 F.2d 1020, 1033
(Fed. Cir. 1992) (en banc).
207. See 60 AM. JUR. 2D Patents § 1004 (2002) (describing the intensive
discovery associated with patent cases); see also Beckson Marine, Inc. v. NFM,
Inc., 292 F.3d 718, 725-26 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (noting that an obviousness defense
looks to the state of the prior art to determine if the invention would have
been obvious "at the time of invention").

1654

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol 87:1621

coincidental, of records or potential courtroom exhibits, which
is especially damaging in patent cases where the corroboration
of witness testimony is required. 20 8 Also, witness and inventor
depositions play a key evidentiary role for both invalidity and
equitable defenses raised in patent litigation. 20 9 As such,
unreasonable delay in the prosecution of patent claims may
result in evidentiary prejudice through the death or impaired
memories of pertinent witnesses and the loss of corroborating
2 10
documents.
For example, Symbol Technologies is ripe for showing
evidentiary prejudice. Because most of the claims pertaining to
bar-code technologies were not drafted until 1989 and seek the
benefit of filing dates from applications filed decades earlier,
Symbol Technologies would be forced to research prior art from
the 1950s and 1960s. 2 1 1 Although this fact by itself may not
create prejudice, the great span of time possibly resulted in
evidentiary prejudice, such as the periodic destruction of
business documents or the death of most witnesses who
attended technology trade shows in the 1950s.
Most
importantly, the Symbol Technologies case commenced in 1998,

208. See Price v. Symek, 988 F.2d 1187, 1194 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (stating that
the Federal Circuit requires corroboration of witness testimony in order to
invalidate a patent); see, e.g., Skinner v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 105 F. Supp.
635, 637 (W.D. Pa. 1952) (listing, among other prejudicial factors resulting
from a patentee's delay, that "records and other physical exhibits have been
lost or destroyed").
209. See, e.g., Teleflex, Inc. v. Ficosa N. Am. Corp., 299 F.3d 1313, 1321
(Fed. Cir. 2002) (discussing the defendant's use of deposition testimony from
the inventor as a basis for asserting an invalidity defense); Kahn v. Gen.
Motors Corp., 135 F.3d 1472, 1479 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (describing the defendant's
use of expert testimony in an attempt to show the patent's invalidity).
210. See Wanlass v. Gen. Elec. Co., 148 F.3d 1334, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 1998)
(suggesting that "the death of a witness, or the unreliability of memories of
long past events" undermine the court's ability to judge the facts (quoting A.C.
Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1033)).
211. See supra note 53 and accompanying text (discussing the sixteen
patents at issue in Symbol Technologies and Lemelson's efforts to draft new
claims directed toward bar-code technology in the late 1980s). For Symbol
Technologies to assert an invalidity defense under § 102, it would need to
uncover evidence, such as documents showing offers for sale or public uses, in
existence more than a year before the effective filing dates of Lemelson's
patents. See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2000). Furthermore, a defense under § 103
often requires expert testimony of what one skilled in the art at the time of
invention would have deemed an obvious improvement. See id. § 103; see also
In re Dow Chem. Co., 837 F.2d 469, 472-73 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (relying on the
testimony of an expert, along with other evidence, to determine that the
invention was not obvious under § 103).
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one year after Lemelson's death, so Symbol Technologies was
unable to depose the inventor due to Lemelson's unusually long
2 12
delay in prosecuting the bar-code technology claims.
Consequently, the only living witnesses with knowledge of
Lemelson's patents were the attorneys who worked for
Lemelson, and they would likely assert attorney-client213privilege
to prevent Symbol Technologies from deposing them.
D. CRAFTING AN "UNREASONABLE AND UNEXPLAINED DELAY"
TEST FOR PURPOSES PROSECUTION LACHES

The Symbol Technologies court held that courts may
render patents unenforceable if they were obtained after an
"unreasonable and unexplained delay" in prosecution. 21 4 But
this holding did not shed light on what circumstances are
sufficiently unreasonable and unexplained. 21 5 Future courts,
however, are not left clueless in determining whether
prosecution laches applies to an applicant's delay.
1. Measurement of the "Unreasonable and Unexplained"
Delay, Not Just Any Delay
The threshold issue in analyzing the delay in prosecution
of patent claims is that the delay must be "unreasonable and
unexplained," not merely a delay. 2 16 Because laches is an
equitable determination, the Federal Circuit has held that the
length of time that courts may deem unreasonable has no fixed
instead depends on the particular
boundaries but
2 17
circumstances.
The traditional form of laches differs from prosecution
laches in the context of measuring the period of delay. For
212. See supra notes 209-10 and accompanying text.
213. In re Spalding Sports Worldwide, Inc., 203 F.3d 800, 804-06 (Fed. Cir.
2000) (holding that the attorney-client privilege applies to communications
between an inventor and his or her patent attorney).
214. See In re Bogese, 303 F.3d 1362, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2002); supra notes
136-37 and accompanying text.
215. See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
216. See supra note 136 (noting that the Symbol Technologies court
phrased the issue in terms of unreasonable and unexplained delay). See
generally Window Glass Mach. Co. v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 284 F. 645,
650 (3d Cir. 1922) (describing the defense of laches in the context of a patent
infringement case and noting that courts "recognize a distinction between
mere delay and unreasonable delay").
217. A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides Constr. Co., 960 F.2d 1020, 1032
(Fed. Cir. 1992) (en banc).
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traditional laches, the period of delay does not begin until after
the patent issues and ends when the patentee files suit. 21 8 The
period of delay for prosecution laches, however, is measured
from the time the claimed subject matter is first disclosed in
the specification until the time when the applicant actively
prosecutes the claims at issue. 219
2. Commercial Gamesmanship Versus Unreasonable Delay
Adding to the complexity of determining unreasonable
delay is the inherent conflict between the Federal Circuit's
endorsement of "commercial gamesmanship" in State
Industries and the Symbol Technologies holding that
prosecution laches may render a patent unenforceable. The
courts must draw a line where "commercial gamesmanship"
crosses over into the realm of "unreasonable and unexplained
delay."22 0 Importantly, prosecution laches should not apply
unless the facts surrounding the applicant's delay in
submitting the new claims to the PTO rise to the level of
"egregious circumstances." 22 1
218. Id. (discussing the period of delay for the traditional form of laches).
219. See, e.g., Webster Elec. Co. v. Splitdorf Elec. Co., 264 U.S. 463, 465
(1924) (noting that the claims at issue "were for the first time presented to the
Patent Office, by an amendment to a divisional application eight years and
four months after the filing of the original application" (emphasis added));
Bogese, 303 F.3d at 1366, 1369 (describing the applicant's eight-year delay
without a single substantive amendment to advance prosecution of the claims
as unreasonable and holding that such a delay is sufficient for prosecution
laches to apply). Interestingly, Bogese claimed priority to an application filed
on June 14, 1978, and actively prosecuted claims through March 16, 1987,
which included two appeals from the PTO board to the Federal Circuit. Id. at
1363-64. The PTO and the Federal Circuit did not find the time consumed by
these appeals to be unreasonable delay because Bogese was actively
prosecuting claims, but instead, they focused on the period of time between
March 1987 and September 1995. Id. at 1366.
220. See supra note 178 and accompanying text (discussing the State
Industries holding and the Federal Circuit's acknowledgement of the
"commercial gamesmanship" as a prevalent strategy); supra notes 136-37 and
accompanying text (describing the Symbol Technologies holding).
221. See supra notes 181-82 and accompanying text (noting that
prosecution laches should render patent claims unenforceable only in
egregious circumstances). In Ford Motor, Magistrate Judge Atkins made it
clear that Lemelson's conduct in delaying prosecution of claims related to barcode technology involved egregious circumstances and did not fall within the
limits of commercial gamesmanship. Ford Motor Co. v. Lemelson, Nos. CV-N92-613-LDG(PHA), CV-N-92-545-LDG(PHA), 1995 WL 628330, at *13-*14 (D.
Nev. June 16, 1995) (finding that "drawing claims to read on currently
marketed technology is not in itself evidence of intent to act inequitably" and
that the commercial gamesmanship strategy "is entirely unlike Lemelson's
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In a post-Symbol Technologies example, Digital Control
Inc. v. McLaughlin Mfg. Co., a district court faced the issue of
determining whether the patentee's conduct during the
prosecution of eight patents amounted to unreasonable and
unexplained delay. 222 The court denied the accused infringer's
motion for summary judgment on its prosecution laches defense
because the undisputed evidence before the court showed that
the patentee followed common practice. 223 Although the Digital
Control court did not use the word "egregious," it made a
comparison to the egregious circumstances in Symbol
Technologies.224 The court did not limit a future finding of
unreasonable and unexplained delay to Symbol Technologies's
facts, but instead noted that "a reasonable fact-finder might
find that certain calculated delays in filing continuation
applications, though on a lesser scale than the facts in Symbol
Technologies, nonetheless constitute an unreasonable and
225
unexplained delay."
3. Factors for Determining the Adequacy of Explanations of or
Justifications for Prosecution Delay
Courts may consider several factors relating to prosecution
delay in determining whether a duration of time constitutes
unreasonable and unexplained delay. The first, and perhaps
most obvious, factor in analyzing the justification for the
prolonged prosecution is the actual duration of the applicant's
delay. The Federal Circuit has held that there are no fixed
boundaries on the length of time that may be deemed
reasonable, 226 and the Supreme Court's holdings in Crown Cork
seemingly infinite introduction of new claims").
222. 225 F. Supp. 2d 1224, 1229 (W.D. Wash. 2002). The patentee filed an
original application on March 1, 1991, and the examiner imposed a restriction

requirement because the application contained four independent groups of
claimed inventions.

Id. at 1225.

The patentee pursued only one of these

invention groups while prosecuting the other invention groups in subsequently
Id. Overall, the patentee filed eight
filed continuation applications.
continuations throughout an eight-year period, all of which issued as valid
patents. Id.
223. Id. at 1225 (finding that "the continuation practice followed by [the
patentee] is common").

224. Id. at 1229 (determining that the patentee "did not wait on their
patent applications while taking no action for decades, as was the case in

Symbol" and finding that the patentee "disclosed [the] device in the initial
patent").
225. Id. at 1228.
226.

See supra note 217 and accompanying text.

1658

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol 87:1621

and General Talking Picturesevince a dislike for arbitrary time
limits in the application of prosecution laches. 227 In some
cases, the period of time from when the claimed subject matter
is first disclosed in the specification until the time when the
applicant actively prosecutes the claims at issue does not, by
itself, affect the court's determination of prosecution laches 228
In other cases, however, the duration of the applicant's delay
may be an overwhelming factor in demonstrating egregious
circumstances. For example, Lemelson added patent claims
directed to bar-code technology in late 1989, yet these patents
claimed benefit to the filing dates of original applications filed
in 1954 and 1956.229 Thus, the delay of several decades in
presenting these claims to the PTO presents a significant
reason for finding egregious circumstances in the Symbol
230
Technologies case.
Another important factor to which a court must look when
determining if a delay in prosecution is sufficiently explained is
the holdup caused by the PTO's actions. The period of time
that a typical patent spends from initial filing to issuance is a
function of the length of time an application waits at the PTO
for an office action and the length of time for the applicant's
response to the office action. 231 Applicants who actively
prosecute their claims cannot control delays that the PTO may
cause, such as time spent awaiting an initial office action from
an examiner, time spent awaiting an appeal from an
examiner's final rejection, or time spent during an interference
proceeding. 232 The Northern Petrochemical court held that
227.
228.

See supra notes 85-90, 146-47 and accompanying text.
Compare In re Bogese, 303 F.3d 1362, 1366, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2002)

(upholding the PTO's determination that the applicant's delay of more than

eight years without actively prosecuting claims constituted prosecution
laches), with Digital Control, 225 F. Supp. 2d at 1229 (holding that the
patentee's conduct, which included filing one continuation application eight
years after the original application, did not rise to the level of unreasonable
and unexplained delay).
229. See supra note 53 and accompanying text (discussing the sixteen
patents in Symbol Technologies and Lemelson's efforts to draft new claims
directed to bar-code technology in the late 1980s).
230. See supra note 224 and accompanying text; see also Ford Motor Co. v.
Lemelson, Nos. CV-N-92-613-LDG(PHA), CV-N-92-545-LDG(PHA), 1995 WL
628330, at *13-*14 (D. Nev. June 16, 1995) (determining that Lemelson's
delay in prosecution of machine vision patents was unreasonable).
231. See Lemley, supra note 28, at 386 (discussing the two factors that
dictate the time spent processing patents).
232. See supra notes 114-17 and accompanying text (discussing Northern
Petrochemical, which held that the claims at issue were delayed by
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prosecution laches did not apply to delays resulting "from
circumstances in the Patent Office" where nothing pointed to a
233
"deliberate or calculated delay on the part of the applicants."
On the other hand, the Webster case shows that prosecution
laches may apply in cases in which an applicant uses an
administrative delay, such as an interference proceeding, to
234
delay the insertion of new claims into a pending application.
An additional factor that courts should consider is the use
of delay tactics by the applicant. As Judge Newman pointed
out in her Symbol Technologies dissent, many of Lemelson's
claims may have been delayed for decades, but he did nothing
to violate the pertinent rules and statutes. 235 The illustration
of delay in Symbol Technologies hints that an applicant may
use certain legal tactics, in addition to the mere filing of
continuations, to extend the duration of prosecution. 236 For
example, the rules require that an applicant respond to an
examiner's office action within three months, but the response
time may be automatically extended for up to six months by
paying a statutory fee to the PTO. 237 The Bogese court listed
part of the prosecution history at issue, which showed repeated
waiting until almost the entire six months expired before filing
a continuation with no substantive response, to show the
applicant's attempt to delay the prosecution of his claims. 238 In
interference proceedings, not by the applicants, and that prosecution laches
does not apply in those circumstances); see also Intuitive Surgical, Inc. v.
Computer Motion, Inc., No. Civ.A. 01-203-SLR, 2002 WL 31833867, at *5 (D.
Del. Dec. 10, 2002) ("Any portion of the delay attributed to the mistake of the
PTO must be considered an 'explained' delay for purposes of the prosecution

laches analysis."). The PTO's goal is to provide an initial office action within
fourteen months after an application is filed, see 35 U.S.C. § 154(b)(1)(A)

(2000), but it is not always successful.
233.
234.

See supra notes 114-17 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 72-79 and accompanying text; see also In re Bogese,

303 F.3d 1362, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2002) ("[A] delay by the PTO cannot excuse the
appellant's own delay.").
235. See supra note 157 and accompanying text.

236. If Lemelson attempted to delay the prosecution of certain patent
claims merely through the repeated filing of continuation applications with no
attempt to advance the examination of the applications, the prosecution

history would have resulted in one or two continuations filed for each year of
prosecution. See, e.g., Bogese, 303 F.3d at 1363-65 (discussing the applicant's
delay of prosecution by means of filing eleven continuation applications over

an eight-year period with no attempt to advance the examination of the
claimed invention).
237. See 35 U.S.C. § 133; 37 C.F.R. § 1.134 (2002) (describing the time
limits for office action responses).

238. See Bogese, 303 F.3d at 1363-66 (recounting the applicant's conduct in
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addition, an applicant may prolong the prosecution of patent
claims by repeating arguments for patentability in a
continuation application that an examiner previously rejected
in a parent application. 239 Another delay tactic, which occurs
either intentionally or coincidentally, is the abandonment and
subsequent revival of an application after the applicant
discovers that the disclosed subject matter has potential
240
economic benefit.
Finally, courts must consider the peripheral justifications
or explanations the applicant sets forth. For example, the
applicant may point to other interference proceedings in the
24 1
PTO that delayed the issuance of the patent claims.
Additionally, one explanation of delay for purposes of the
traditional forms of laches is "wartime conditions," which the
242
courts may likely adopt for purposes of prosecution laches.
On the other hand, the Federal Circuit has held that poverty,
by itself, is a not satisfactory explanation and that inability to
find willing counsel is a widely rejected justification for
delay. 243 Importantly, precedent shows that the patentee
should offer explanations for the alleged delay, as opposed to
requiring the accused infringer to demonstrate that the delay is
244
unexplained.
delaying the prosecution of patent claims).
239. Id. at 1365-66 (showing that the applicant filed eleven continuations
without a single amendment or argument to overcome the examiner's final

rejection of the asserted claims and holding that such conduct constituted
prosecution laches).
240. The PTO's rules involving abandoned applications permit the revival
of any application where "the delay in reply.., was unintentional," without
regard to the period of abandonment. 37 C.F.R. § 1.137(b). These rules do
have several simple requirements, such as a mere statement by the applicant
that "the delay in filing the required reply . . . was unintentional." Id. §
1.137(b)(1)-(4).
241. See supra notes 114-17 and accompanying text (discussing the Federal
Circuit's holding that prosecution laches does not apply to delays caused by

the PTO).
242. A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides Constr. Co., 960 F.2d 1020, 1033
(Fed. Cir. 1992) (en banc) (citing Armstrong v. Motorola, Inc., 374 F.2d 764,
769 (7th Cir. 1967)).
243. Hall v. Aqua Queen Mfg., Inc., 93 F.3d 1548, 1554 (Fed. Cir. 1996).

244. Id. (holding that the patentee "failed to present a legally cognizable
excuse for his unreasonable delays"); Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1033 ("A court
must also consider and weigh any justification offered by the plaintiff for its
delay." (emphasis added)); see also Ford Motor Co. v. Lemelson, Nos. CV-N-92613-LDG(PHA), CV-N-92-545-LDG(PHA), 1995 WL 628330, at *12 (D. Nev.

June 16, 1995) (describing Lemelson's delay in submitting machine vision
patent claims to the PTO and, in the context of prosecution laches, finding

20031

PROSECUTIONLACHES

1661

CONCLUSION
In Symbol Technologies, the Federal Circuit concluded,
with brevity and clarity, that the equitable doctrine of
prosecution laches is a cognizable defense.
The Symbol
Technologies court's analysis of the history of prosecution
laches, both before and after the 1952 Patent Act, agrees with
legal commentators who have analyzed the issue in detail. The
Symbol Technologies holding, however, did not offer
substantive guidance on how trial courts should apply
prosecution laches in future patent litigation. This problem
becomes more evident when a court faces the inherent friction
between Symbol Technologies's support for the prosecution
laches defense and the Federal Circuit's long-standing
acquiescence to "commercial gamesmanship."
As a solution to this dilemma, courts should use a sensible
test for applying prosecution laches that is formulated from
prior Supreme Court precedents, the Symbol Technologies
holding, and the Federal Circuit's case law relating to the
traditional form of laches. First, the doctrine of prosecution
laches requires a showing of prejudice before the court may act
in equity to bar enforcement of the patent claims. One aspect
of prejudice that is required by Supreme Court precedent is the
existence of intervening adverse rights, while the court may
also consider economic or evidentiary factors.
Second,
prosecution laches requires that the prejudice results from a
delay in prosecution. As expressed in Symbol Technologies,
that delay must be "unreasonable and unexplained," not merely
a delay.
Factors that should influence the proffered
explanations for a delay include the duration of the delay,
actions within the PTO over which the applicant had no
control, the applicant's use of delay tactics (in addition to the
filing of continuation applications), and any peripheral
justifications presented by the patentee. Finally, one of the
Federal Circuit's general principles regarding laches requires
that where the equity is applied to bar all relief, such as the
defense of prosecution laches, the circumstances of delay and
prejudice must be egregious. This principle, in combination
with the previously described prosecution laches test, provides
the appropriate balance between the interest in providing fair
incentives to inventors and the interest of protecting those who
encounter unreasonably delayed patent claims. Just as the
that "Lemelson offer[ed] no explanation").

1662

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol 87:1621

Supreme Court fittingly concluded in Brenner v. Manson, "[A]
patent is not a hunting license. It is not a reward for the
245
search, but compensation for its successful conclusion."

245. 383 U.S. 519, 536 (1966).

